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The common view that buyer power of insurers may effectively counteract provider
market power critically rests on the idea that consumers and insurers have a joint
interest in extracting price concessions. However, in markets where the buyer is an
insurer, the interests of insurers and consumers to reduce prices may be importantly
misaligned. The positive dependence between loss size and the insurer’s expected
profits limits the insurer’s incentives to reign in loss sizes; in markets with small
initial loss sizes, insurers may try to raise these in order to create demand for
insurance.
After having defined insurance and non-insurance markets based on the initial
loss size, we develop theory to show that insurers with buyer power have incentives
to create insurance markets. Insurer competition will push their profits to zero but
markets do not return to the initial non-insurance state. This constitutes a welfare
loss. We design experimental insurance markets to test our theory and find sup-
port. Monopolistic insurer-subjects in non-insurance markets increase loss sizes to
establish insurance markets. Insurer competition eliminates profits but not the loss
size to uninsured consumers. This provides an additional reason to be careful in
granting insurers buyer power.
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With a few exceptions, market power is considered to have a detrimental effect on consumer
welfare. One suggested exception is that in markets with supplier concentration, granting buy-
ers countervailing power enables them to extract discounts from these suppliers. Consumers
benefit when these negotiated discounts are passed on to them. This argument has been used in
product markets but also in insurance markets where the buyers are insurers who bargain with
service suppliers such as hospitals about the price of treatment. However, in markets where
the buyer is an insurer, the interests of insurers and consumers to reduce input prices may
be importantly misaligned. Given risk-averse consumers, the positive dependence between the
insurer’s expected profits and the loss size consumers face puts natural limits on the insurer’s
incentives to pursue lower loss sizes. To the contrary, insurers may try to raise loss sizes in
order to expand the market for insurance. This positive dependence of consumer demand on
input prices distinguishes markets where the downstream firm is an insurer from other product
markets where demand is a function of final-good prices only.
The consequences of buyer power have been studied theoretically and empirically for general
retail markets where downstream buyers negotiate prices with upstream suppliers (Chae and
Heidhues, 2004; Inderst and Wey, 2007, and Elllison and Snyder, 2010) and for the specific case
where insurers negotiate with service suppliers such as hospitals (Sorensen, 2003; Lakdawalla and
Yin, 2015; Trish and Herring, 2015; Ho and Lee, 2013). These studies illustrate that the relation
between service supplier concentration and insurer countervailing power on negotiated prices,
premiums and welfare is complex.1 Studying the introduction of Medicare Part D, Lakdawalla
and Yin (2015) find that insurer bargaining power leads to significant price reductions but only
when the upstream manufacturers face sufficient competition in their product market. Trish
and Herring (2015) find that health insurance premiums are lower when insurer concentration
is high in markets relevant to insurer bargaining with hospitals, but higher when concentration
is high in the markets where the insurance is sold. Ho and Lee (2013) report mixed effects of
the removal of one large health insurer on the premiums set by insurers with negotiated prices
1Snyder (2008) summarizes the literature on countervailing power since Galbraith (1952) and concludes
“The concept of countervailing power was controversial in Galbraith’s day (. . . ), and continues to be so
today. Formalizing the concept is difficult because it is difficult to model bilateral monopoly or oligopoly,
and there exists no single canonical model.”.
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increasing or decreasing up to 15% across markets. An important common feature of all these
studies is that they take the risk and, consequently, the demand for the insurance as given and
focus on how concentration on either the supplier and/or the buyer side influences the outcome
of the bargaining game that unfolds.
We instead investigate insurers’ incentives to engage in loss prevention in contexts where
these activities potentially have a negative impact insurance on demand. Take the extreme case
of an insurer with full buyer power who very successfully reduces the potential loss consumers
face. He possibly erodes his own market because consumers may not to bother to buy insurance
when the downside is negligible. Because of this mechanism, the interests of insurers and con-
sumers may be importantly misaligned . In particular, in markets with small initial loss sizes
the insurer has incentives to use his buyer power to create an insurance market by increasing
the potential loss.
Attention for this dimension of insurance markets has been scant, with the exception of the
theoretical contributions by Schlesinger and Venezian (1986, 1990). They explicitly examine the
insurers’ incentives to engage in loss prevention and loss reduction, which they define as reducing
the probability of a loss and reducing the severity of any loss that does occur, respectively.
Despite the conclusion that for loss reduction “the incentive is to reduce the size of small losses
while simultaneously increasing the size of large losses”2, in both papers they mostly ignore
the possibility that an insurer would act to the detriment of consumers, arguing that: “. . . such
action is likely to meet with resistance from the individual (. . . ) as well as from insurance
regulators.”3 Given the possibilities to cover up such activities, we are less sanguine about this
possibility.
Central in our analysis is a categorization of markets into insurance and non-insurance
markets based on what we call the initial loss size. A market’s initial loss size is the loss size
that would prevail without insurer intervention. We define a market ‘an insurance market’ if
the initial loss size is sufficiently large for risk-averse consumers to prefer buying insurance over
staying uninsured when the insurance is priced at actuarially fair rates. On the other hand, a
‘non-insurance market’ is characterized by initial loss sizes sufficiently small such that, even if
offered at actuarially fair rates, risk-averse consumers do not bother to buy coverage because




We make two main contributions. First, we formulate (Section 2) the distinction in insurance
and non-insurance markets in a state-preference framework (Arrow, 1964). This representation
allows us to build the argument that in non-insurance markets, insurers with buyer power have
incentives to increase the initial loss size in order to create an insurance market. We also show
that competition between insurers erodes their profits by pushing premiums to the actuarially
fair rate. However, the market does not return to the initial state where potential losses are
sufficiently small for consumers not to buy insurance; the transformation into an insurance
market therefore results in a irreversible welfare loss. This is different in markets that are
insurance markets by nature. In those markets, competition also erodes insurer profits, but in
their quest for lower premiums insurers will push the prices of suppliers all the way to marginal
cost, greatly benefiting insurees.
The second contribution is that we take our theoretical predictions to the lab. We report
the results of a number of experiments designed to investigate under which conditions insurers
can tweak the risk to which the uninsured are exposed to their own benefit but possibly to
the consumers’ disadvantage. The risk manipulation can in principle take either the form of
increasing either the probability of a loss or the size of a potential loss; in this paper we focus on
the latter. For our purposes, one obvious advantage of conducting an experiment over analyzing
empirical data is that we can observe and control whether a market constitutes an insurance
market by setting the initial loss size. We set up markets with five consumers and one (monopoly
treatment) or two (duopoly treatments) insurers. The monopoly treatment (Monop-NI) is used
to examine whether the extent to insurer-subjects with market power seize the opportunity to
increase the potential loss to which consumers are exposed. The duopoly treatments aim to
study the premium and loss size setting strategy of competing insurers in insurance (Duop-I)
and non-insurance (Duop-NI) markets. This allows us to test our theoretical prediction that
competition will be more beneficial for consumers in insurance markets than in non-insurance
markets.
In each period, the consumer-subjects each receive an endowment of e20 but they may lose
part or all of this endowment with a given probability. The insurer decides on the amount at risk
(the potential loss size) and sets a premium. Consumers subsequently make the binary decision
to either taking insurance by paying the premium to the insurer or to go uninsured. In the
final step, nature decides whether a consumer experiences a loss in that period. In the duopoly
treatments with seven participants, two subjects have the role of insurer and the remaining five
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subjects can select one of these insurers to buy insurance or decide to go uninsured. We sidestep
issues of adverse selection and moral hazard by assuming throughout that all agents have perfect
information.
Our main experimental findings are as follows. First, insurer-subjects in the non-insurance
monopoly treatment Monop-NI are well able to select the loss size-premium combination that
maximizes their profits conditional on the risk-preferences of the consumer-subjects assigned to
their market. The loss size is on average set at e16.44 and, with a loss probability of 60%, the
accompanying premium of on average e11.59 more than compensates for any expected losses.
In this market, consumers earn an average surplus of e9.22. Second, competition between
insurers in the non-insurance duopoly market Duop-NI wipes out insurer-profits, reduces the
average loss size to e4.99 and increases average consumer surplus to e15.36. However, we do
not observe a reversion to the initial non-insurance state where consumers do not face any loss:
the average loss size uninsured consumers face is a still sizeable e7.71 which can be attributed to
the threat to insurers that their market is eaten away if loss size become too small. In fact, with
e3.54, the average premium faced by consumers in the duopolistic insurance market Duop-I is
even somewhat lower (significant at the 10% level) than in Duop-NI and with e16.21 average
consumer surplus is not significantly higher. In sum, if it is left to insurers, the distinction
between non-insurance and insurance markets disappears and all markets become insurance
markets, independent of whether the insurers face competition.
Beside these two main contributions, our study also contributes to the research on the
stability of risk preferences across decision contexts (Barseghyan et al., 2011; Einav et al.,
2012). Our design with non-automated live-buyers necessitates that we meticulously account
for consumer risk preferences to rule out that between-treatment heterogeneity in preferences is
driving our results.4 To accomplish this, we split the experiment in two stages with the actual
market game being preceded by a risk-elicitation stage. We elicit and estimate risk-preferences
using the multiple price list methodology that has also been applied by Von Gaudecker et al.
(2011). A comparison of the first (risk-elicitation) and second (market game) stage choices of
consumer-subjects allows us to address the question whether individuals exhibit the same risk
attitudes when they are put in a strategic market context instead as when they are submitted to
an individual risk-elicitation task. We find that the elicited risk attitudes predict a consumer’s
4This is in particular an issue because our experimental markets are small, having five consumers in
each market; an insurer who is randomly assigned more risk-averse consumers is able to attain higher
profits.
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insurance choices in a market context reasonably well but that they exhibit some inclination to
make less averse choices when the insurance market is competitive. The latter may be because
consumers have an expectation that in a competitive environment playing hard to get is more
likely to result in receiving more favorable offers in future periods.
2 Theoretical Framework
Figure 1 presents in state-claims space the decision-problem of a monopolistic insurer facing
a risk-averse consumer with a strictly concave utility function U(·), U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0.5
There are two possible states of nature, a good state Wg and a bad state Wb, distinguished by
whether the consumer with initial wealth W experiences a loss of size L or not. Let p denote the
probability of a loss (“bad state”). The 45o line is the certainty line comprising the collection
of contingent claims with equal consumption in both states of the world. Indifference curves
in state-claims space are defined as the set of claims for which a consumer’s expected utility
V (Wg,Wb) = pU(Wb) + (1 − p)U(Wg) is constant. These indifference curves are convex for
risk-averse consumers.6
When the initial loss size L0 = 0, consumers keep their initial wealth W in both states, that
is, they face the initial state claim (W,W ) shown as point D in the figure. This clearly is a
non-insurance market. If the consumer faces a positive transaction cost c in buying insurance,
the market will continue to be a non-insurance market for all initial loss sizes L0 for which
the certainty equivalent CE(L0) is such that U(CE(L0)) = U(W − pL0 − c) ≤ pU(W − L0) +
(1 − p)U(W ), the left-hand side of this inequality corresponds to point MS in Figure 1, the
right-hand side to point LS. For piMS < c the market is a non-insurance market for all initial
loss sizes L0 ≤ LS (all points on the vertical line between D and B) because the transaction
cost exceeds a monopolistic insurer’s profit margin.
Figure 1 immediately shows that the monopolistic insurer has strong incentives to push the
initial state claim towards (W,W − LL) (point A) with corresponding expected profits piML by
increasing the loss size to LL, the exogenously defined maximum loss size. We state this as a
proposition the formal proof of which is given in the appendix:
5For ease of exposition, we assume that consumers have homogenous risk preferences. In the analysis of
the experimental data we relax this assumption and explicitly allow for the possibility that the consumers
the insurer faces in his experimental market may have heterogeneous risk preferences.
























Figure 1: Small and large potential losses in the state-claims model.
Proposition 1. When consumers are risk-averse, the expected profits of an monopolistic insurer
charging a premium R(L) = W − CE(L) are increasing in L.
In this case, offering insurance at premium RM (LL) makes the consumer indifferent between
buying insurance (contingent claim ML) and staying uninsured (contingent claim A). Without
countervailing bargaining power towards suppliers, the insurer’s expected profits are piML on each
policy sold. With countervailing buyer power, the insurer may extract price concessions from
suppliers such that his direct claims costs are less than LL in case one of his clients experiences
a loss. This may further increase his profits: in the most extreme case he negotiates a price
of 0 such that his per-client profits equal the premium paid R(LL). It is of key importance
for the insurer that this negotiated deal is not available to the non-insured, because otherwise
the contingent claim of the uninsured returns to point D and the insurance market is fully
eroded. In case of exclusive deals and no competition in the insurance market, the insurer has
no incentive to pass the negotiated discounts to its insured consumers, such that consumers
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remain indifferent between buying insurance (point ML) or not (point A).
In sum, when the initial loss L0 = LL, the presence of a monopolistic insurer does neither
benefit consumers nor wreak havoc on their welfare. When the initial loss size L0 < LL,
consumers may experience a loss in welfare because of the attempts by insurers to increase the
loss size, possibly to its maximum.
2.1 Competition in the Insurance Market
How does competition in the market for insurance affect these outcomes? Absent buyer power,
insurers take the initial state claim (W,W −LL) as given and will offer insurance at competitive
prices. That is, consumers can exchange one unit of wealth in good times for one unit of wealth in
bad times at the actuarially fair ratio of (1− p)/p. In Figure 1, these fair price lines are shown
as dotted lines. In an insurance market with L0 = LL, consumers benefit from competition
because they can now reach the contingent claim CL instead of A.
What if the insurers compete for consumers but each have full buyer power towards sup-
pliers? Is this the best of worlds that brings consumers back to point D? The answer is
that this critically depends on whether negotiated discounts also become available to uninsured
consumers. If not, uninsured consumers continue to face a loss LL while insurers have strong
incentives to negotiate discounts to enable them to profitably undercut the premium of their
competitors. In case the supplier has zero marginal cost and the insurer does not have any
variable cost, competition will push the contingent claim offered by insurers to point D. All
consumers will choose to buy insurance at zero premium while the insurers’ profits equal zero.
We again state this association between the level of competition in the insurance industry and
insurance premiums as a formal proposition:
Proposition 2. Let c be the transaction cost a consumer experiences when buying insurance.
For given c let L(c) be the potential loss for which a consumer is indifferent between buying
insurance at the actuarially fair rate or remaining uninsured. When two insurers compete in
premiums (R1, R2) and loss sizes (L1 and L2), in equilibrium R1 = R2 = L1 = L2 = 0 and
E[pi1(L1)] = E[pi2(L2)] = 0, for any potential loss L ≥ L(c) faced by the uninsured.
However, if the negotiated deals are also available to the non-insured (i.e. L = min{L1, L2}),
competitive insurers with buyer-power will only push back the loss size to L1 = L2 = L(c).
Lower loss sizes would erode the insurance market because consumers would no longer bother to
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buy insurance since the benefits to not exceed the transaction cost c. In equilibrium, consumers
are indifferent between buying insurance (point CS) or not (point B) while insurers’ profits
again equal zero. Notably, the market in this case remains an insurance market and consumers
are worse off than at point D. Only when the transaction cost c = 0, consumers will take out
insurance for any small risk. In that case L(0) = 0 and the equilibrium will be similar to the
exclusive negotiated deals case with insurers offering contingent claim D.
2.2 An Illustrative Example
As indicated, transitions of markets from non-insurance markets are hard to identify in practice
because the initial loss size L0 is not observed. To illustrate how this mechanism may function,
we provide a stylized example how efforts to counteract supplier market power with insurer
market power may backfire.
Consider a product market with a monopolistic firm that supplies two vertically differentiated
versions of a particular product, a version of quality qL and a second version of qH . The unit
cost of production of each version is constant but higher for the high quality version, cL < cH .
Consumers receive a surplus of U = θq − x if they buy a product of quality q at price x and
0 otherwise.7 Consumers are heterogenous in their taste for quality, with a fraction λ having
taste parameter θH and the remaining fraction 1 − λ having taste parameter θL < θH . Up to
this point, the set up is similar to the simple vertical differentiation model that can be found in
Tirole (1988, p. 96-97). The profit-maximizing supplier will always find it in its interest to offer
both the low quality and the high quality product to the market.
Now suppose that the consumer is risk averse with utility function u(w) = 1− e−γw with w
denoting his wealth level and γ the parameter of risk aversion. The potential loss the consumer
faces is equal to the price x he paid for the product. One can show that for certain parameter
values of γ, λ, θL, θH , cL, cH , qL.qH and p, the insurer maximizes his expected profits when the
supplier only supplies the higher quality product, giving him an incentive to eradicate the supply
of the low quality product. Moreover, when the consumer “narrow bracket”, that is, treats the
purchase and insurance decision as two separate decisions effectively ignoring the risk of loss
in his purchase decision, the increase in the insurer’s expected profits may exceed the decrease
in profits of the supplier compared to the situation where the supplier provides both products.
In that case, the insurer can offer full compensation to the supplier: The supplier and insurer
7We use x to denote price in order to prevent confusion with the loss probability p.
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maximize their joint profits by offering only the high quality product but consumer surplus would
be higher in the situation where both products are available.8 Evidence has been established
that people often do narrow bracket (Read et al., 1999; Gottlieb and Mitchell, 2015) and it is
conceivable that people have different mental accounts for expenditures on consumption items
and insurance.
That said, the narrow bracketing assumption may not hold in all decision contexts. In
case consumers incorporate the insurance decision when buying the product, the prospect of
paying an insurance premium may reduce their willingness to pay for the product, with a higher
reduction for the high quality product since the premium is increasing in loss size. This implies
that the insurer may still benefit when only the high quality product is supplied but that joint
profits do not increase.
2.2.1 The Dutch Market for Electric Bicycles
The Dutch market for bicycles seems fit the description of a market that has recently turned into
an insurance market because of the introduction of a new, high quality product: the electric bicy-
cle (E-bike). With annually more than 1 million bicycles sold on a population of approximately
17 million, bicycles in the Netherlands are very much an article of everyday use.9
Figure 2 shows that from 2007 to 2014, the sales of bikes with a value of less than e300 has
dropped by half, from a market share of over 30% to less than 15%. In the same period, the
sales of bicycles in the highest price category (>e900) has almost doubled from a initial market
share of 14% to 27%. The main reason for this trend is the increasing popularity of the E-bike:
Dutch citizens used to ride traditional bicycles but they have increasingly shifted to E-bikes.
The main difference between the two types of bicycles is the addition of a rechargeable battery
that offers pedal assistance.10
One effect of this development has been that the bicycle market has become attractive for
insures: Whereas consumers did not bother to insure their traditional bicycle, they do insure
the more expensive E-bikes. Insurance companies clearly benefit from this development. As
one large insurance company says in a press release: “In the first half of 2015, Unive´ has sold
8In Appendix A.3 we show this for the set of parameter values: cL = 0.10; cH = 0.15; θL = 0.3; θH =
0.6; qL = 0.6; qH = 0.8;λ = 0.3; p = 0.3 and γ = 0.9.
9These and the following numbers on bicycle sales are based on information provided by the RAI
Association of vehicle manufacturers and importers, https://www.raivereniging.nl
10Figure B.1a and Figure B.1b in the Appendix show an example of a traditional and E-bike, respec-
tively.
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Figure 2: Bike sales Netherlands per price category 2007-2014.
at least 30 percent more bike insurance policies. A large majority of these insurance policies is
specifically for the electric bicycle.”11
Now suppose that bicycle producers in this market would enjoy market power. Would this
help in lowering prices and increasing consumer welfare to counteract the market power of
bicycle suppliers by granting insurers countervailing power? The model in the preceding section
suggests that the answer may be no. Instead, insurers may have incentives to phase out the
sales of traditional bikes and support the sales of electric bicycles with the costly add-ons. The
reason is that every cost reduction also reduces the risk to which the uninsured are exposed,
which directly threatens the existence of this novel insurance market.
Systems of preferred suppliers can be an effective means to achieve these objectives. Of-
tentimes, insurance policies only cover a loss when their customer visits one of their selected
service suppliers for repair or treatment. Insurance companies typically claim that they only
select certified suppliers that satisfy the highest quality standards.12
11https://www.unive.nl/actueel/unive-ziet-aantal-fietsverzekeringen-stijgen, visited 06
October 2015.
12For example, the web site of Interpolis, a leading Dutch insurance company, states the following [trans-
lated from Dutch]: “As of September 22, 2010 Interpolis works for repairing window damage only with re-
covery companies that are affiliated with the FOCWA or BOVAG. These organizations set strict demands
on quality, warranty and service. They monitor connected recovery companies there regularly. Interpolis




3 Experimental Design and Research Hypotheses
Our experiment consists of two stages, a risk elicitation stage (Stage I) and a market stage
(Stage II). The first stage is designed to elicit the individual level of risk-aversion of subjects.
Subjects play this stage in isolation and this stage is the same in all treatments. In the second
stage subjects play a market insurance game in groups of 6 (monopoly-treatment) or 7 (duopoly-
treatment) subjects. Five subjects are randomly assigned the role of consumer and the other
one or two group members assigned the role of insurer. For 30 periods, the insurer chooses a
combination of loss size L and premium R. By paying the premium R consumers can insure
themselves against the event of a loss of size L. Consumers may also choose not to buy insurance.
We implement three treatments, one monopoly treatment and two duopoly treatments. All
treatments consist of a risk elicitation stage followed by a market stage. The two duopoly
treatments differ in the potential loss size faced by uninsured subjects. These differences are
explained further below where we discuss the two stages in greater detail.
3.1 Stage I: Risk elicitation
The first stage of the experiment measures the individual risk preferences of all participating
subjects. Our procedure closely follows the procedure used by Von Gaudecker, Van Soest and
Wengstro¨m (2011) who use multiple price lists with pie-charts as a graphical tool to help describ-
ing the probabilities of the outcomes. Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008) review the different risk
elicitation methods used in the laboratory including the multiple price list design. We refer the
interested reader to their paper for details and the advantages and drawbacks of each method.
We will only give a description of our design and indicate at which points we depart from the
literature.
Each subject is presented with a screen containing a 6 × 2 payoff matrix such as shown
in Figure 3. In each row, subjects have to choose between option A or option B. This binary
choice is between two lotteries but in our design, the lottery headed under ‘Option B’ is always
degenerate: when selected, a sure payoff is received. This is a departure from most of the
literature, including Von Gaudecker et al. (2011), with the exception of Heinemann, Nagel
and Ockenfels (2009). We chose this setup to make the decision-making process for subjects
as similar as possible to the one they face in Stage II. There the choice is also between a non-
degenerate lottery (not insure) and a certain amount (take insurance). The payoff matrices are
designed such that a rational risk-neutral subject will always prefer option A in the first row
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and option B in the last row and will switch from A to B in one of the intermediate rows. The
procedure does however not impose monotonicity: subjects are allowed to switch from A to B
in a certain row and to switch back to A in a later row. If subjects show consistent behavior,
they are directed to a sub-screen with the same payoffs but a finer probability grid with steps
of 5%.
Subjects face a total of 25 screens (50 including sub-screens) with each screen depicting a
particular loss size-premium (L,R)-combinations with L = 4, 8, 12, 16, 20 and R = 2, 4, . . . 18
and R > L. In total, subjects thus make 150 (300) decisions in Stage I.13
Figure 3: Example of a Stage I multiple price list decision screen.
There is a rich literature on risk and risk perception that measures peoples’ risk attitudes
in the laboratory. The common finding of these studies is that most people are risk-averse
and tend to overestimate the value of avoiding low-probability risks (McClelland et al., 1993).
Another experimental finding relevant for the current context is that individuals tend to have a
disproportionate preference for certainty (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012).
Von Gaudecker, van Soest and Wengstro¨m (2011) and others have shown heterogeneity in risk
13To compare, in the elicitation design of Von Gaudecker et al. (2011) subjects make 28 to 56 decisions
including possible sub-screens.
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preferences. Therefore, it is better to estimate individual specific risk preference parameters.14
All these studies estimate (individual) risk preferences by presenting subjects with different
sets of lotteries constructed by the researcher, a procedure we follow in Stage I. The bets buyers
face in Stage II are instead constructed by the subject(s) with the role of insurer. This raises
two questions. First, to which extent are insurer-subjects able to learn the risk attitudes of their
population of potential buyers and to offer loss size/premium combinations that maximize their
expected profits? Second, are choices made by consumer-subjects in the two stages consistent,
such that the revealed risk preferences in Stage I can predict a consumer-subject’s Stage II
choices? The answer to the second question is also important in illuminating the issue whether
risk attitudes elicited by individual-decision tasks in the lab carry over to interactive market
contexts. We are not aware of any other experimental studies that have investigated these issues.
3.2 Stage II: The market insurance game
The second part last for 30 periods. Subjects are randomly matched into separate markets of
six or seven subjects. In the monopoly (duopoly) treatment, in each group one (two) randomly
chosen subject(s) are assigned the role of insurer; the remaining five subjects have the role of
consumer. Subjects with the role of consumer are given an initial endowment of W =e20. In
each period, the insurer-subjects in the group have the task to set a premium Ri and a loss
size Li, both in the range [0,W ] (i = 1, 2). By paying the premium to the insurer, consumers
are protected against the event of a loss. Losses occur with an exogenously given probability
p = 0.60.
Ex ante, we envisioned that insurer-subjects might have difficulties in simultaneously choos-
ing two strategic variables, so we also ran a number of sessions with an exogenously given loss
size (these are the sessions no. 1-3 and 8-10 in Table B.1). In this way, we could see whether
for given loss sizes insurer-subjects were able to find the profit maximizing premium in their
market. It turned out that they were able to do so. For that reason, in what follows we focus
on the sessions with endogenous loss sizes.15
14Risk preferences have also been estimated in the field (Beetsma and Schotman, 2001; Harrison et
al., 2007; Dohmen et al., 2010) or using field data by inferring risk preferences from deductible choices
(Cohen and Einav, 2007; Ericson et al., 2015). Using data on people’s deductible choices, Sydnor (2010)
and Barseghyan et al. (2013) find that people overinsure in real life insurance markets.
15We also ran a number of sessions with a smaller loss probability of p = 0.20 (Sessions 4, 7 and 12 in
Table B.1). Results of the sessions with exogenous loss sizes and p = 0.2 are available upon request.
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3.3 Monopoly treatment
The monopoly treatment Monop-NI is designed as a non-insurance market with initial loss size
L0 = 0. Uninsured consumers face a potential loss of L, with L determined as
L = max(L1, L0). (1)
This resembles a non-insurance market because without the presence of the insurer, consumers
would face a potential loss equal to L = L0 = 0. In such a market, the presence of an insurer
can only increase the potential loss of the uninsured. The loss size set by the monopolist is
to be interpreted as the non-exclusive negotiated price with a service supplier in case one of
the insurees experiences a loss. After having learnt the premium(s) and the potential loss L,
consumers decide whether or not to insure. Note that this experimental setting is akin to the
extreme case where the insurer has full bargaining power vis-a`-vis the supplier. In practice, this
may happen when the insurance company is vertically integrated with the upstream market.
3.4 Duopoly treatments
In the two duopoly treatments of the experiment, this potential loss for the uninsured is deter-
mined as
L = max(min{L1, L2}, L0), (2)
with L0 the initial loss size and Li the loss size set by insurer i. Notice that with L2 set to 0, this
reduces to equation (1). We implement two choices of L0: a non-insurance market (Duop-NI)
for which L0 = 0 and a insurance market (Duop-I) for which L0 = 20.
Figure 4 shows an example of a decision screen consumers may face in Stage II of Duop-NI:
when uninsured, consumers face a potential loss of 1 (= 20 − 19, so the lowest loss size chosen
by the two insurers has been 1); they can insure against this loss, by buying insurance from
insurer 1 at a premium of 0.5 or from insurer 2 at a premium of 12.0. Most likely, insurer 2
has set a much larger loss size. It is conceivable that in this period, insurer 2 will not attract
any customers. This illustrates the strong incentive embodied in (2) for competing insurers to
undercut the rival’s loss size, giving the competitive outcome of Proposition 2 its best shot.
Table 1 gives a summary of different Stage II treatments.
Payoffs In each period, an insured consumer’s earnings equal W −R and the earnings of an
uninsured consumer are W in case no loss occurs and W −L in case of a loss. Insurer i’s profits
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Figure 4: Example of a Stage II consumer decision screen in the Duop-NI treatment.
Table 1: Summary of Stage II treatments: The market insurance game
Treatment # # Decision Pot. loss Loss prob. #
cons. insurers variables uninsured (p) sessions
Monop-NI 5 1 R, L max(L, 0) 0.6 3
Duop-NI 5 2 R1, R2, L1, L2 max(min{L1, L2}, 0) 0.6 2
Duop-I 5 2 R1, R2, L1, L2 max(min{L1, L2}, 20) 0.6 2
equal Ri times the number Ni of consumers that bought insurance from him minus Li times the
number of realized losses among his clientele. The subjects’ earnings in Stage II are determined
as follows. For consumer-subjects, one randomly selected Stage II period is paid out at the end
of the experimental session.
For insurer-subjects we decided on a different payment structure because payment based on
a single period may result in losses even for insurers who systematically set their premium higher
than the expected loss in case the randomly chosen period turns out to a period in which a high
number of their customers happens to experience a loss. To avoid this, insurer-subjects were
paid 10% of their accumulated profits. This payoff structure may also help to induce insurer
subjects to behave as risk-neutral agents because the impact of an individual random draw on
their final earnings becomes small.
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3.5 Research hypotheses
We derive the theoretical equilibrium predictions for the experimental monopoly and duopoly
markets under the assumption that consumer-subjects are risk-averse and insurer-subjects are
risk-neutral.
Monop-NI (L0 = 0) The monopolistic insurer has an incentive to set L1 higher than zero
in order to create a market for his product. Proposition 1 predicts that the insurer will set L1
to the maximal value of 20. With risk-averse consumers, the profit-maximizing premium will
be R1 > pL = 0.6 × 20 = 12, with the exact value depending on the degree of risk aversion.
This prediction corresponds in Figure 1 to contingent claim ML for the insured and A for the
uninsured.
Duop-NI (L0 = 0) In the non-insurance duopoly market, competition will push back loss
sizes to the point L1 = L2 = L(c), the potential loss for which a consumer is indifferent between
buying insurance at the actuarially fair rate or remaining uninsured. Competition will also
force insurers to charge actuarially fair premiums R1 = R2 = p × L(c). We do not observe the
cost of effort c experimental subjects experience in buying insurance but for c > 0, we expect
to see equilibrium premiums and loss sizes strictly above zero. This prediction corresponds to
contingent claim CS in Figure 1.
Monop-I and Duop-I (L0 = 20) Negotiated discounts are not available to uninsured
consumers who continue to face a potential loss of L0 = 20. The presence of one or more
insurance companies can therefore only benefit consumers by offering protection against a large
potential loss. The monopolistic insurer does not have to worry that lowering L1 will reduce the
demand for his product because of the exclusivity of any negotiated discount. For this reason,
and because L1 is the price the insurer has to pay to the service supplier in case one of his
customers experiences a loss, he has an incentive to set L1 as low as possible, that is: equal to
0. As in the L0 = 0 case, the profit-maximizing premium will be R1 > pL = 0.6× 20 = 12, with
the exact value again depending on the degree of risk aversion. This prediction corresponds in
Figure 1 to contingent claim ML for the insured. The uninsured face contingent claim A but
other than in Monop-NI this is independent of the potential loss size selected by the insurer.
For this reason, we do not implement treatment Monop-I because the only predicted difference
with Monop-NI is higher profits for the insurer-subjects.
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For the duopoly market, the fact that uninsured consumers continue to face a potential loss
of L0 = 20 ensures that the insurance market will not erode. The exclusivity of negotiated
discounts thereby lifts the constraint that prevents insurer-competition in Duop-NI to push
loss sizes to 0. The unique equilibrium for this case is when R1 = R2 = L1 = L2 = 0. This
prediction corresponds to contingent claim D in Figure 1.
The theoretical predictions regarding the choices made by the insurer-subjects in the experiment
are summarized in Table 2. These predictions are the research hypotheses of our experimental
investigation. The table shows that compared to the initial claim size L0, consumers in non-
insurance markets are worse off when one or more insurance companies with buyer power enter,
unless the transaction cost of taking out insurance is 0. In the latter case, they are equally
well off in the duopoly, but not in the monopoly case. Consumers in insurance markets are
equally well off when a monopolistic insurer with buyer power enters and strictly better off
when two competing insurers with buyer power enter. In sum, granting insurers countervailing
buyer power only seems a good idea when the market actually is an insurance market and the
insurers face sufficient competition from other insurers.
Table 2: Research hypotheses on the predicted outcomes in the experimental markets
(risk-averse consumers, loss probability p = 0.6).
Cont. Loss size Expected Premium Consumer
claim uninsured profit preference
Non-insurance market (L0 = 0)
Monop-NI ML 20 piML > 0 > 12 I ∼ NI
Duop-NI CS L(c) 0 0.6× L(c) I ∼ NI
Insurance market (L0 = 20)
Monop-I ML 20 > 12 > 12 I ∼ NI
Duop-I D 20 0 0 I  NI
4 Experimental Procedure and Data
The experiment was conducted at the CREED experimental laboratory of the University of
Amsterdam in June and November 2012 and October 2013. Sessions lasted between 1h25m and
1h50m. We ran a total of 20 sessions in which a total of 377 subjects participated in 60 separate
markets. Of these subjects, 245 participated in one of four treatments described in the previous
section: 60 (66) in the monopoly market with exogenous (endogenous) loss size and 56 (63) in
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the duopoly market with initial loss size L0 = 0 (L0 = 20). The other 132 subjects participated
in a monopoly market with an exogenous (72) or endogenous (60) loss size but a lower loss
probability of p = 0.2 instead of 0.6. Table B.1 gives a summary of the experimental design and
the number of subjects in each treatment.
Students who showed up at the CREED-lab but could not participate (because multiples
of 6 or 7 students were needed) were sent away after payment of a e7 show-up fee. The other
subjects were paid one randomly chosen decision in Stage I and Stage II if they had the role of
consumer in Stage II; subjects with the role of insurer in Stage II were paid out one randomly
chosen decision in Stage I plus 10% of the accumulated profits in Stage II. We used a 1 : 1
conversion rate of euro’s in the experiment to euro’s paid.
Table 3 summarizes per treatment the most important background characteristics plus some
of the outcomes, splitting the sample based on the subject’s role in the market stage. The
average age of 21/22 years reflects the fact that our sample consists of students of the University
of Amsterdam. In all treatments, about half of the subjects is female. For age and gender,
no significant differences between treatments are found. When we consider final earnings, we
observe that subjects on average earn e27.28 which is well-paid for an experiment that lasts
about 1h35m.16 The risk elicitation stage is the same for all treatments so earnings are also
very similar. There is however large between-treatment variation in the market stage earnings.
Insurer-subjects earn on average e13.74 in the market stage of the monopoly treatment but
are not able to attain positive earnings in the competitive non-insurance market Duop-NI.
However, in the competitive insurance market Duop-I, insurers earn on average e21.83, which
is significantly more than in the monopolistic non-insurance market. As we will see, the reason
for this is that insurer-subjects in these markets manage to set the losses that they have to
payout to their clients at very low levels while only partly passing these benefits to their clients
in the form of low premiums.
For consumer-subjects, the actual earnings have not been recorded for the two stages sep-
arately, but because we can assume that earnings in the risk elicitation stage are very similar
across treatments, differences in total earnings are likely to reflect differences in earnings in the
market stage. We observe that in both Duop-NI and Duop-I, consumer-subjects leave the lab
with more money than in Monop-NI with no significant differences between the two duopoly
treatments. In the next section, we will study in greater detail the underlying behaviors that
16e1 = $1.33, exchange rate of January 1st 2013.
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Table 3: Summary statistics subjects (standard deviations in parentheses) (p = 0.6).
Monop-NI Duop-NI Duop-I
L0 = 0 L0 = 0 L0 = 20
Role: Insurers Consumers Insurers Consumers Insurers Consumers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction females 0.182 0.472 0.467 0.486 0.500 0.459
(0.405) (0.504) (0.516) (0.507) (0.519) (0.505)
Age 21.73 22.30 22.00 21.16 21.53 21.22
(1.79) (3.28) (3.82) (2.69) (2.88) (2.50)
Risk elicitation stage
γˆi median 0.029 0.081 0.089 0.083 0.082 0.095
mean 0.029 0.091 0.2003* 0.110 0.072 0.101
(0.061) (0.079) (0.309) (0.111) (0.054) (0.086)
τˆs(i) median 1.274 1.136 1.202
mean 1.284 1.169 1.231
(0.068) (0.087) (0.148)
Final earnings (in e)
Total earnings1 29.74 25.70 12.87∗∗∗ 29.02∗∗ 36.50††† 28.52∗
(10.69) (7.89) (7.00) (6.09) (18.87) (8.13)
Risk elicitation stage 16.00 - 14.12 - 14.67 -
(4.20) (-) (6.30) (-) (6.17) (-)
Market stage 13.74 - -1.26∗∗∗ - 21.83††† -
(8.21) (-) (4.43) (-) (17.25) (-)
obs. 11 55 16 40 18 45
Notes: 1 For consumer-subjects, it was not separately recorded which of the stage I and II decisions
were paid out (subjects were only informed about their earnings after the experiment had ended).
∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) indicate statistically significant differences with Monop-NI at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-
level);
†††(††,† ) indicate statistically significant differences with Duop-NI at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
Significance based on two-sided pairwise nonparametric Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests.
have caused these outcomes.
5 Experimental results
We split the discussion of our results in three parts. First, in Section 5.1 we analyze the results
of the risk elicitation stage. The high number of subject-decisions in this stage allows us to
estimate risk attitudes at the individual level. We evaluate the consistency of subjects’ stage I
choices and compare our risk preference estimates with those found elsewhere in the literature.
As an extra check on the success of our randomization, we also compare the distribution of risk
preferences across treatments, distinguishing between subjects assigned the role of consumer
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in the market stage and those assigned the role of insurer. Section 5.2 returns to the main
topic of this paper by presenting the outcomes of the market insurance game. We relate the
results regarding the premiums and loss sizes observed, the consumers’ insurance choices and
the insurers’ profits to the research hypotheses as summarized in Table 2.
Of particular interest for our purposes is to analyze between-stage decision-consistency by
subjects assigned the role of consumer in the market stage. To which extent do the decisions in
the risk elicitation stage correctly predict the decisions these subjects make in the market stage?
The type of decisions they face in both stages is very much comparable, but whereas they are in
an individual decision-making game in Stage I with the options offered by a computer, they are
in a strategic market context in Stage II when the options are offered by another subject in their
market. Any observed difference in behavior would be indicative that subjects have a different
attitude towards choosing between risky prospects and insurance choices. Section 6 presents an
elaborate analysis of these issues.
5.1 Individual risk preferences
First, we use the decisions from the risk elicitation stage to estimate the individual-specific risk
parameter for the subjects with the role of consumer in the market stage of the experiment.
To this end, we apply a structural econometric model related to the one introduced by Von
Gaudecker et al. (2011) and estimate this model by maximum likelihood.17 For ease of compar-
ison, we borrow their notation. We assume that subjects’ risk preferences can be represented
by an expected utility framework with the standard CARA exponential utility function
u(z, γ) = −1
γ
e−γz. (3)
with z ∈ R denoting a lottery and γ ∈ R the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
In the risk elicitation stage, subjects i ∈ {1, . . . , N} repeatedly choose between two lotteries
piAj and pi
B
j (j ∈ {1, . . . , Ji}). Lottery A is a binary lottery with a high outcome Ahigh that
happens with probability phigh and a low outcome Alow that happens with probability 1−phigh;











17Motivated by their research objectives, the model in Von Gaudecker et al. (2011) also incorporates
loss aversion and time preferences for uncertainty resolution in the utility specification. In our study,
none of the lotteries A and B involves a loss and subjects receive immediate feedback on whether or not
a loss has occurred and in all cases get paid out immediately after the end of the experiment.
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Let the outcome variable Yij be such that:
Yij =
{
1 if the individual chooses B
0 otherwise.
(5)
The corresponding certainty equivalents are:
CE(piAj , γi) = − ln{−γiu(piAj )}/γi and CE(piBj , γi) = Bcertj . (6)
with























Combining equations (6) and (7), the difference in the certainty equivalents of lottery A and B
can be written as:
∆CEij = CE(pi
B






j + (1− phighj )e−γiA
low
j } (8)
We follow Von Gaudecker et al. (2011) in our further econometric implementation. Whereas a
perfectly rational decision-maker selects piBj if and only if ∆CEij > 0, we allow for uncertainty
by adding Fechner errors ij to the deterministic economic model (see e.g. Graham Loomes,
2005). The decision problem of the individual now reads:
Yij = I(∆CEij + τij > 0) with τ ∈ R+ (9)
with I denoting an indicator function. If Yij = 1, individual i chooses to buy insurance when
faced with choice situation j. The behavioral interpretation of this specification is that individu-
als may be prone to some degree of inattention when evaluating the options, with the likelihood
of choosing the less-preferred option increasing as ∆CE becomes small. The individual’s prob-
ability to make this type of ‘mistakes’ increases with the parameter τ ∈ R+. As pointed out by
Von Gaudecker et al. (2011), using certainty equivalents instead of utility differences facilitates
comparisons across subjects. Other than Von Gaudecker et al. (2011), our main interest is in
using the estimation procedure to back out the risk-preferences of individual subjects in the
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different experimental estimates. To this end, we estimate the individual-specific risk-preference
parameter γi, whereas Von Gaudecker et al. (2011) try to retrieve the distribution of this param-
eter in the population. This higher flexibility in estimating individual risk-preferences implies
that we have to be more parsimonious in other dimensions. For this reason, and because this
is outside the scope of the current paper, we do not allow for “trembling hand” type of errors
individuals to choose randomly with a given fixed probability (Harless and Camerer, 1994).18
The probability of the observed choice Yij of individual i in choice situation j, given all the
















where s(i) denotes the session in which subject i participates and Λ(t) = (1 + e−t)−1 the
cumulative standard logistic distribution function. We estimate the parameters by maximum
likelihood. The log likelihood function maximized is the sum of the log likelihood contributions
of each subject.
Figure 5 shows the histogram of the estimated individual risk preference parameters of the
subjects in our sample. It is reassuring that with a median value of 0.082 and a mean value
of 0.1033, the resulting distribution is very similar the population distribution estimated by
Von Gaudecker et al. (2011, Figure 4a).19 Reassuringly for the success of our randomization,
Table 3 shows that for consumers, the estimated risk-preference parameters are very similar
across treatments; for subjects acting as insurer, we find that those in Duop-NI are slightly
more risk averse (p = 0.068) than those in Monop-NI. For Duop-NI, a regression however does
not indicate a relation between insurer risk attitudes and the minimum premium available to
consumers in the market stage.20
Figure 6 shows for subjects in Monop-NI and Duop-NI with different risk preference esti-
mates (one risk loving, one ‘risk neutral’ and one risk averse) the risk-elicitation stage choices that
involved a loss probability of p = 0.6. In the map, the solid line indicates the choice-situations
18As Von Gaudecker et al. (2011), we estimate τ together with the preference parameters but whereas
all individuals have the same τ in their specification, we can allow for session-specific τ ’s (τs, with
s ∈ {1, . . . , S} and S the total number of sessions) because we do not include a ‘trembling hand’ parameter.
As they notice, it proves difficult in practice to estimate heterogeneity in τ and the ‘trembling hand’
parameter separately.
19Von Gaudecker et al. (2011) impose more structure and for this reason their distribution is smoother
than ours.
20We regressed the average minimum market premium on the insurer’s estimated γ’s while clustering















Figure 5: Distribution of estimated risk aversion parameters γ.
that make a risk-neutral agent indifferent between taking insurance or staying uninsured. To
the left of this line, she would choose to insure, to the right to stay uninsured. The dots are
filled (hollow) when the subject actually decided (not) to insure in the risk-elicitation stage when
faced this situation by choosing Option B (A). Since each of the 25 screens only contained one
such decision, each dot in Figure 6 relates to a different screen (ignore the squares for the mo-
ment, these relate to Stage II decisions).21 In this light, it is remarkable how consistent subject
choices in this stage are: the areas of filled and hollow dots are almost completely separated. A
vertical comparison of the panels reveals that the differences in γˆ’s indeed reflect the differences
in individual risk-preferences in choices that involve p = 0.6, this despite the fact that the γ’s
are estimated also including the choices that involve loss probabilities p 6= 0.6.
5.2 The Market Insurance Game
In this section, we will present the treatment effects on the key outcome variables of the market
stage of our experiment: premiums, loss sizes, expected consumer earnings and insurer profits.
However, our design with non-automated live-buyers necessitates that we first consider which
(R,L)-combinations are most profitable in our experimental markets and ascertain whether
these combinations are roughly the same across treatments. To this end, we construct per
treatment for each (R,L)-combination with p = 0.6 the aggregate demand for insurance by
considering the Stage I decisions of the subjects who are assigned the role of consumer in the
21For example, the combination (R,L) = (2, 12) appeared in screen #3, the combination (R,L) =
(6, 12) in screen #21.
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(a) Monop-NI: Subject #512 (γˆ = −0.040). (b) Duop-NI: Subject #1518 (γˆ = −0.006).
(c) Monop-NI: Subject #1212 (γˆ = 0.002). (d) Duop-NI: Subject #2003 (γˆ = 0.009).
(e) Monop-NI: Subject #502 (γˆ = 0.108). (f) Duop-NI: Subject #1603 (γˆ = 0.101).
Figure 6: Choices by selected subjects in treatments Monop-NI (left panels) and
Monop-NI (right panels). Loss probability p = 0.6.
Notes: The solid line is the risk neutral line: a risk-neutral agent should choose (not) to insure for
choice-combinations to the left (right) of this line. The dots show the subject’s actual decisions in the
risk-elicitation game (Stage I): they are filled and green when Option B (‘insure’) has been chosen and
hollow and red if Option A (‘not insure’) has been chosen. The squares shows the offers made by the
insurers in the market stage (Stage II): these are filled and blue if the consumer-subject took the offer.
The size of the squares in increasing with the period in which the offer was made. Estimates of γ based
on all Stage I choices.
25
market stage. This procedure provides us with a map for the aggregate demand for insurance
at the treatment level.22 These maps are shown in Figure 7. The squares in the grid indicate
the actual decisions of subjects in the risk elicitation stage. The numbers next to the squares
indicate how many chose to take insurance (the more subjects take insurance the greener the
square is). The maps also show the iso-expected-profit curves of a monopolistic insurer who
would serve such a (hypothetical) market. For example, in Monop-NI, 49 subjects (out of the
55) decided to buy insurance (i.e. they chose Option B) when options A and B corresponded to
(R,L) = (4, 8).23
There are a number of important points to take away from these maps. First, in line with the
individual estimates of risk preferences, in all treatments a majority of consumer-subjects shows
risk-averse behavior. For example, in all treatments, most subjects decide to buy insurance at a
premium 8 to be safeguarded against a 60% probability to lose 12. Second, the iso-profit curves
are very similar across treatments, reinforcing our earlier observation that any difference in
outcomes cannot be explained by treatment heterogeneity in consumer risk preferences. Third,
in each of these markets, a profit-maximizing monopolistic insurer would do best if he sets the
loss size close at 20 and offers insurance at a premium of about 14 to 16.24
In sum, if the decisions of consumer-subjects in the market stage of this experiment are
consistent with their first stage elicited risk-preferences (which is investigated in Section 6.1),
monopolistic insurer-subjects indeed maximize expected profits by setting the loss size L at the
maximal value, in line with the theoretical argument posed in Proposition 1. We next turn to
the question whether insurer-subjects in Monop-NI are able to uncover the particular iso-profit
map of their market and set the loss size and premium to the profit-maximizing level.
5.2.1 The Monopolistic Non-Insurance Market
In Table2 we hypothesize that monopolistic insurers in the non-insurance markets Monop-NI
will design a contingent claim ML such that the premium exceeds 12, the uninsured face a loss
size of 20 and expected profits piML are strictly positive. The results in Table 4 provide some
22The per-market aggregate demand functions may look slightly different because each market only
contains a sub-sample of five consumer-subjects. In the online Appendix we provide plots for each separate
market.
23This particular combination corresponds to the fourth choice situation in Figure 3.
24We provide a numerical example for Monop-NI: at a premium of 14 and a loss size of 20, 37 subjects
out of the 55 consumer-subjects would take insurance and the insurer’s per consumer expected profits
would equal (37/55)× (14− 0.6× 20) = 1.35; setting a loss size of 16 and a premium of 10 would lead to





Figure 7: Stage I aggregate decisions by consumer-subjects (squares) for choice combina-
tions involving a loss probability p = 0.6 and the corresponding iso-expected-profit curves
for a monopolistic insurer.
Notes: The number to the right of each (L,R)-combination denotes the total number of consumer
subjects in the treatment that chose Option B (‘insure’) in the risk-elicitation stage. Based on these
choices, we calculate the profits an insurer earns in expectation when offering (L,R) in all 30 periods.
Iso-profit lines are shown for the levels [−200,−100, 1, 20, 40, 60, 80]. The plots were created in Matlab
using the interp2 function for interpolation of the gridded data. The solid line is the risk neutral line.27
Table 4: Main experimental outcomes (market level standard deviations in parentheses).
Periods 1-15 16-30
Monop-NI Duop-NI Duop-I Monop-NI Duop-NI Duop-I
Min. Premium (R) 10.68 5.29∗∗∗ 4.53∗∗∗ 11.59 4.99∗∗∗ 3.54∗∗∗,†
(1.89) (1.41) (1.43) (2.17) (1.15) (1.68)
Loss Size (L) 15.16 9.02∗∗∗ 20.00∗∗∗,††† 16.44 7.71∗∗∗ 20.00∗∗∗,†††
(1.41) (2.5) (0.00) (2.96) (2.07) (0.00)
Fraction Insured 0.44 0.59 0.96∗∗∗,††† 0.53 0.44 0.96∗∗∗,†††
(0.10) (0.23) (0.04) (0.16) (0.19) (0.04)
Expected Profits 2.87 -1.25∗∗∗ 6.93∗∗∗,††† 4.59 -0.12∗∗∗ 7.27†††
Insurers (2.50) (1.47) (2.92) (3.18) (0.69) (4.24)
Expected Earnings 10.33 14.94∗∗∗ 15.18∗∗∗ 9.22 15.36∗∗∗ 16.21∗∗∗
Consumers (1.83) (1.43) (1.47) (2.12) (1.15) (1.82)
obs. 11 16 18 11 16 18
Notes: ∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) indicate statistically significant differences with Monop-NI at the 1%-level (5%-level,
10%-level);
†††(††,† ) indicate statistically significant differences with Duop-Nl at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
Significance based on two-sided pairwise nonparametric Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests.
support. When we focus on the final 15 periods, both the uninsured loss size and the premium
are far above zero, although the loss size for the uninsured is strictly below the upper bound
of 20 (p < 0.00125) and, correspondingly, the average premium is with 11.59 not significantly
different from 12 (p = 0.545, two-sided t-test) but sufficiently high to generate profits that are
strictly positive in expectation (p < 0.001). Consumers on average take out insurance in 52.7%
of the cases, a number that is not significantly different from 50% (p = 0.205, two-sided t-test).
Insurers’ average expected profits are 4.59 and clearly positive whereas consumers expected
earnings are on average 9.22. This is still somewhat better (p < 0.001) than the expected
earnings of 8 (= (1 − 0.6) × 20) consumers can expect to earn in case no insurance would be
offered to protect against a potential loss of 20 that materializes with probability p = 0.6 but
the point of course is that the potential loss does not come down.
Figure 8 shows for all treatments the average market loss sizes and premiums over time and
the average percentage of consumers that buys insurance in a given period. Panels (a) and (b)
show that in Monop-NI, average potential loss sizes and premiums settle fairly quickly around
the values of 16 and 12, respectively. The average percentage of consumers buying insurance
(panel (c)) continues to show considerable variation, which is indicative of insurer-subjects efforts
to tweak the loss size/premium-combination such that they extract the maximal surplus from
25p-values in this section are bases on one-sided t-tests, unless stated otherwise.
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(a) The average potential loss size uninsured consumers face.
(b) Average premium set by insurers.
(c) Average percentage of all consumers that decides to buy insurance.
Figure 8: Per period average market stage outcomes for Monop-NI (triangles) and
Duop-NI (circles) and Duop-I (squares).
Notes: The dashed lines depict the mean ± two standard error confidence intervals. The loss size for
the uninsured is always 20 in Duop-I and therefore not shown in panel (a).
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the consumers in their market.
Figure 9 shows for each treatments the average per period profits and earnings insurers
respectively consumers can expect given their choices and the objective loss probability p = 0.6.
Note that in considering ex ante expected outcomes instead of ex post realizations, the plots
ignore the noise caused by the idiosyncratic draws of nature that influence the actual outcomes
subjects experience. Panel 9a clearly shows that as the experiment progresses, insurer-subjects
in Monop-NI learn how to attain higher profits. Panel 9b shows that as a result, consumer
earnings decrease over time.
For the example subjects in Figure 6, the squares denote the premium-loss size combinations
that were actually offered to them the insurer(s) in their market. Squares are solid (hollow) if
the subject decided (not) to accept the offer. Larger squares correspond to later periods in the
market stage. For the markets shown, the (L,R)-choices of the insurer in market #502 (panel
e) clearly converge to the theoretical prediction of (20, 14). This is less true for the choices of
the insurers in markets #512 and #1212. The iso-profit curves for those markets (see the online
Appendix) show that this is because the consumer risk-preferences in those markets generate
a rather flat profit function in (L,R)-space without a clear maximum. In general, insurer-
subjects seem well able to find the profit maximizing combination of their two choice variables
given the risk-preferences of the consumers in their market. This is a remarkable achievement,
especially since they do not know the consumer-subjects with whom they form a group nor their
risk-profile.26
5.2.2 Competitive Insurance and Non-Insurance Markets
For the duopoly markets, the hypotheses (see Table 2) are that independent of the initial loss
size, the introduction of competition should reduce both the expected profits to zero; in the
insurance market Duop-I, premiums should also be zero in equilibrium (with all consumer-
subjects preferring coverage over staying uninsured; in Duop-NI we expect that insurers, in an
attempt not to erode the market for insurance, will continue to set the loss size (and thereby
the premium) strictly above zero. That is, they will primarily compete in premiums but less in
loss sizes.
26Levitt (2006) shows for a real-life situation that firms can have problems in selecting the profit-
maximizing price.
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(a) Average expected insurer profits.
(b) Average expected consumer earnings.
Figure 9: Per period average expected insurer profits and consumer earnings for Monop-
NI (triangles) and Duop-NI (circles) and Duop-I (squares).
Note: The expected profits and earning are calculated assuming that consumers (insured and uninsured)
experience a loss with probability p = 0.6.
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Duop-NI Figure 8 shows that when compared to Monop-NI, the introduction of competition
leads to significantly lower loss sizes and premiums (see also Table 4). Table 4 and Figure 9 also
show that, in line with our hypothesis, insurers are not able to make positive profits in this market
(p = 0.681 for the final 15 periods). Figure 9 shows that in time, insurer-subjects learn how
to break-even in these markets. Compared to the non-insurance monopoly market, consumers
significantly benefit from insurer competition with average expected earnings increasing from
about 9 to more than 15.
However, despite competition, the market remains an insurance market: the loss size the
uninsured face does not drop to 0 but remains at a significantly higher value of 7.71 (p < 0.001).27
That is, as predicted, competition moves the contingent claim for the insured in Figure 1 from
point ML to CS while the uninsured face contingent claim B. Importantly, both insured and
uninsured consumers are worse off than when they faced the initial state claim D.
Duop-I In the competitive insurance market Duop-I, uninsured consumers continue to face
a loss size of 20 (contingent claim A in Figure 1). Our hypotheses state that insurer-competition
will lead insurers to transfer all advantages of negotiated discounts to their consumers by lowering
the premiums up to the point where both premiums and the losses to be recouped by insurers
are 0 (point D); in equilibrium, all consumers will prefer to buy insurance.
Table 4 and Figure 8c show that throughout, over 95% of all consumer-subjects chooses to
buy insurance. This insurance market is a real boon to the insurer-subjects because they quickly
learn to set the value of the loss that they have to recoup to zero while, despite competition,
they are still able to charge significantly positive premiums of on average 3.54 in the final fifteen
periods (p < 0.001). Although the premiums do not converge to zero, they are at the 10%-level,
significantly lower than in the non-insurance markets Duop-NI (p = 0.083). This difference can
be attributed to the threat the insurers in the non-insurance markets Duop-I face that pushing
the loss sizes too low will erode their market. For this reason, they refrain from ‘negotiating’
as fiercely as in treatment Duop-I. Figure 9b suggests that expected consumer earnings are on
average even a bit higher in the competitive insurance market with initial loss size L0 = 20 but
this difference is statistically insignificant.
In sum, in case the potential loss to the uninsured is 20, consumers are clearly better of when
27As one insurer-subject explained in the post-experiment survey [translated from Dutch]: “Because
I determined the loss size, I tried to lower this in exchange for a higher premium (such that both I and
the consumers would be better off as long as they continued to pay the premium). However, this did not
succeed. The temptation for the others not to insure proved too great.”
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there is a competitive market for insurance: the insurers (who have all the bargaining power)
negotiate great deals with the service supplier and transfer part of this advantage to their
insurees in the form of lower insurance premiums. Our results thus show that for high risks
(expensive services), having a competitive insurance market with the insurers having bargaining
power increases consumer welfare.
On the other hand, our evidence shows that in markets that are non-insurance markets by
nature, the introduction of competition between insurers does not necessarily push premiums
and loss sizes back to the initial state: consumer earnings are similar in the competitive non-
insurance and insurance markets and in the non-insurance markets, they end up paying even
slightly higher premiums to receive coverage. Figure 9a contains an important policy implication:
from the observation that insurers in a market do not make profits, one should not conclude that
competition forces insurers to do all they can to offer insurance at the lowest possible prices.
6 Further checks
In this section, we report some additional analysis on the data that serves as a further check on
our results. First, in Section 6.1, we address whether the choices made by consumer-subjects
in the risk-elicitation stage are indicative of their behavior in the subsequent market stage.
Then, as a check on the external validity of our findings, we investigate in Section 6.2 how the
consumer-subjects’ elicited risk attitudes relate to insurance purchases they make in every-day
life. We collect information on this in an ex post survey. Finally, Section 6.3 considers for
insurer-subjects whether there is a relation between their risk-attitudes and the offers made in
the market stage.
6.1 Consistency Risk Elicitation and Market Stage
Do risk-preferences elicited in the laboratory adequately capture the behavior of an individual
in choices under uncertainty outside the lab? The stability of risk preferences across decision
contexts is an important and mostly open research question.28 We zoom in on one particular
element of this question: Do subjects exhibit the same attitude towards risk when they are
put in a strategic market context instead of an individual risk-elicitation task? We answer this
question by consider the consistency between the stage I and II choices of consumer-subjects.
28See the recent survey by Barseghyan et al. (2015) and the references therein.
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The first part of Table 5 contains the results for risk-elicitation stage. This stage is identical
for all treatments such that it is only natural that the average value of the individual risk
preference estimates γˆi is very similar. We use these estimated γi’s to back out for each consumer-
subject i the average difference in the certainty equivalent (∆CE) between option A and B that
he or she is confronted with in Stage I, the mean of these values is reported in Table 5, as is the
number of choices between option A and B that is correctly predicted when individual i’s are
represented by utility function (3) with γ = γˆi. Given that the estimated γi’s are similar across
treatments and that subjects face the same choice problems, it is not surprising to find that
the mean ∆CE value and the success rate of the (in-sample) predictions is very similar across
treatments with the estimated utility model predicting on average 84% of all choices correctly.
In the market stage, the options A and B are endogenously set by the insurer-subjects. This
results in the options consumer-subjects face being less extreme than in the risk elicitation stage.
For example, an insurer-subject has no interest offering insurance against a potential loss of 20
at a premium of 2. This is also manifest in Figure 6: the offers of insurers tend to be centered
along the risk-neutral line. This implies that one cannot simply do a between-treatment of the
success rate of the realized (out-of-sample) predictions for the market stage. For this variable,
Table 5 indeed reveals large differences: from 65.2% in Monop-NI to 95.3% in Duop-I. The
high number in Duop-I is caused by the presence of the clearly unattractive option of staying
uninsured (and facing a potential loss of 20) in the latter treatment. This leads to a large ∆CE
in evaluating the options and a correspondingly low chance that a subject makes a ’mistake’.
As ∆CE becomes smaller, the likelihood of the ‘mistake’ of choosing the less preferred option
grows. The small market stage ∆CE’s in Monop-NI and Duop-NI are indicative of insurer-
subjects manoeuvring the premium-loss size combination into a region where consumer-subjects
become close to indifferent between whether or not to buy insurance.
For this reason, we correct as follows for between-treatment differences in the ∆CE values
of the options available to consumers. Conditional on the estimated γi’s and τ ’s and given the
value ∆CEij of each offer j posed to subject i, we use (9) to calculate the probability that the
subject does not make a mistake. We then take for each consumer-subject the average of these
probabilities. Averaging over all consumers in a given treatment then gives us the predicted
number of correct decisions that takes into account between-treatment differences in the offers
consumers face. Table 5 shows that the predicted and actual percentage of correct decisions are
relatively close in the duopoly treatments. For Monop-NI, the table reveals an overprediction
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of correct decisions. That is, given their choices in the first stage and the offers they face in the
market stage, consumer-subjects seem to make more inconsistent choices than can be explained
by random mistakes only.
Table 5: Choices by consumer subjects in the risk elicitation and market stage (p = 0.6).
Treatment Monop-NI Duop-NI Duop-I
I. Risk Elicitation Stage
mean ∆ CE 3.837 3.878 3.879
mean γˆ 0.081 0.083 0.095
correct decisions 84.1% 83.9% 84.7%
II. Market Stage
mean ∆ CE 1.550 1.165 11.296
correct decisions (predicted) 73.4% 69.1% 99.1%
correct decisions (realized) 65.2% 72.3% 95.3%
Difference (in perc. points) -8.2 3.2 -3.8
Incorrect predictions
insured 45.53% 28.16% 0.00%
uninsured 54.47% 71.84% 100.00%
# incorrect predictions 574 309 64
fraction incorrect predictions 0.348 0.258 0.047
obs. 55 40 45
While the difference between the predicted and realized number of correct decisions tells us
how well the risk preferences in the first stage predict the actual behavior of consumer-subjects
in the market stage, it is not informative about the direction of any bias. To investigate whether
people behave more or less risk-averse when put in a market context, we next consider whether
the estimated γi’s over- or under-predict the demand for insurance in the market stage. To
this end, we plot in Figure 10 for each treatment separately the market stage decisions that
are inconsistent with the individual risk preferences estimated in Stage I. Panel 10c for example
shows that for Duop-I where the total number of incorrect predictions is very small, they are
all in the same direction: consumer-subjects do not buy insurance in choice-situations where
they should have given their estimated risk preferences. In other words, they sometimes behave
less risk-averse in this particular market context. Also for the other competitive treatment
Duop-NI, 71.8% of all incorrect predictions predict that subjects should have bought insurance
whereas in practice they decided to go insured. Figure 10b reveals that in many of these
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cases, consumer-subject rejected offers that were actuarially more than fair. In Monop-NI,
the incorrect predictions are rather evenly split between predicting buying insurance when the
subject did not and vice versa. Figure 10a also does not reveal a bias in a particular direction.
The main take away is that the elicited risk attitudes predict a consumer’s insurance choices
in a market context reasonably well but that they exhibit some inclination to make less averse
choices when the insurance market is competitive. Possibly this is caused by the expectation
that in a competitive environment playing hard to get is more likely to pay off in the form of
receiving more favorable offers in future periods.
6.2 Consumer-subjects: Insurance purchases outside the lab
In the short survey administered at the end of the experiment we asked participants whether
they were insured against a number of common risks. Our list included comprehensive travel
insurance, cancellation insurance, prolonged warranty insurance, dental insurance and personal
possessions insurance. Table 6 shows the prevalence of these insurances in our sample.29 About
two-thirds of all subjects indicate to own a Permanent Travel Insurance and Dental Insurance,
which makes these the most commonly owned insurance policies in our sample.
Table 6: Insurances owned by subjects (standard deviations within parentheses).
Treatment Monop-NI Duop-NI Duop-I
Permanent Travel Insurance 0.677 0.679 0.769
(0.471) (0.471) (0.425)
obs. 62 53 52
Cancellation Insurance 0.274 0.208 0.365
(0.37) (0.285) (0.455)
obs. 62 53 52
Prolonged Warranty Insurance 0.153 0.123 0.115
(0.308) (0.276) (0.291)
obs. 62 53 52
Dental Insurance 0.774 0.630 0.667
(0.422) (0.487) (0.476)
obs. 62 54 51
Peronal Possessions Insurance 0.071 0.106 0.133
(0.26) (0.312) (0.344)
obs. 56 47 45
To see whether the estimated risk preferences reflect an individual’s subject’s propensity to
29The answer categories are “YES”, “NO” and (for the cancellation and prolonged warranty insurance)





Figure 10: Stage II insurance choices inconsistent with estimated Stage I risk preferences.
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buy any of the insurances listed in Table6, Table 7 reports the estimates of a regression of the γˆi’s
on dummy variables for owning any of these. The results show that the insurance dummies are
jointly insignificant. At first sight, the absence of a risk-coverage correlation may be surprising
but it isn’t once one realizes that equilibrium insurance premiums are influenced by a myriad of
other factors including adverse selection (Chiappori and Salanie´, 2014).30
A final issue to consider is whether the insurance policies participants buy outside the lab
have, next to the γi’s estimated in the first stage, any predictive value in predicting subject’s
insurance choices in the market stage of the experiment. To this end, Table 8 reports for each
treatment the results of a probit regression of a dummy variable indicating whether insurance was
bought in the market stage on a number of explanatory variables. As expected, the probability of
buying insurance is positively correlated with an individual’s degree of risk aversion, negatively
correlated with the premium one needs to pay for the insurance and positively dependent on the
potential loss faced when uninsured.31 F -tests reveal that in Duop-NI, the dummy variables
on insurances owned are statistically significant at the 5% level. However, from the sign of
the individual coefficients, no clear picture emerges about how, next to knowing a person’s risk
attitudes as represented by γˆi, a consideration of an individual’s actual purchases informs the
experimenter about the subject’s choices in the market stage.
6.3 Insurer-subjects: Risk attitudes and offers
One motivation for our introduction of the payoff structure where we pay insurer-subjects in
the market stage 10% of their accumulated profits is that this may induce them to behave more
risk-neutral because it reduces the impact of individual random draws (determining the loss of
an insured consumer) on their final earnings. To see whether this approach has been successful,
Figure 11 plots for each experimental market the average minimum premium at which insurance
was offered against the estimated individual risk-preference parameter of the insurer-subjects in
that market. In Duop-I, the minimum market premium however seems to be negatively related
to the private risk preferences of the insurers offering the premium. A simple regression confirms
this (β = −12.96; p = 0.011;n = 18). A somewhat similar tendency is observed in Monop-NI
(β = −12.31; p = 0.237;n = 11) but not in Duop-NI (β = −0.42; p = 0.679;n = 16).
We established (Figure 9a) that selling insurance in Monop-NI and Duop-I is far more
30Cohen and Siegelmann (2010, p. 62) notice that “A riskcoverage correlation appears to be a feature
of some insurance markets or pools of insurance policies but not of others.” See also Ericson et al. (2015).
31In Duop-I the estimated relations are less clear-cut due to the high overall (> 95%) take-up rate.
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Table 7: Relation Stage I risk preferences and outside lab insurance choices.
Dependent variable γˆi






Prolonged Warranty Insurance -0.02
(0.045)







profitable than in Duop-NI. For this reason, one possible reading of the relation between market
premiums and insurer risk preferences shown in Figure 11 is that a higher degree of risk aversion
is correlated with a higher eagerness/impatience to make a sale. So insurers in these treatments
may not act fully independent of their private risk-preferences. For our experimental findings,
this means that the minimum premiums reported in Table 4 may underestimate the equilibrium
values that would obtain in a setting with risk-neutral insurers selecting the offers (as we expect
actual insurance firms to do).32
7 Summary and conclusions
The question how concentration in downstream markets enables buyers to effectively improve
their bargaining position in price negotiations with service suppliers continues to be complex.
This paper argues that this is especially true in markets where the buyers consist of insurance
companies who negotiate on behalf of their customers. Existing empirical studies focus on the
relation between competition intensity in the up- and downstream market and the negotiated
prices but mostly take the costs of the upstream firms as given. We emphasize that when insurers
can use their bargaining cloud not only to arrive at better prices but also to influence the cost
32A more general implication is that inferences from laboratory experiments on Bertrand competition
using pools with risk-averse subjects may overstate the competitiveness of real-life markets in which
risk-neutral firms compete in prices. This is a topic that deserves further research.
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Table 8: Relation Stage II and outside lab insurance choices.






female 0.246∗∗∗ -0.088 0.004
(0.078) (0.067) (0.011)
age -0.075 -0.031 -0.052
(0.101) (0.223) (0.037)
age2 0.002 0 0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001)
minimum market premium -0.102∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.035) (0.004)
potential loss uninsured 0.094∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ –
(0.022) (0.023) (–)
Insurances owned
Travel Risk Insurance 0.198∗ 0.168∗∗ -0.008
(0.1) (0.081) (0.01)
Dental Insurance 0.095 0.13∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.068) (0.014)
Cancellation Insurance -0.065 -0.311** 0.019
(0.111) (0.129) (0.013)
Extended Health Insurance 0.2 -0.166 -0.013
(0.132) (0.142) (0.024)
Peronal Possessions Insurance 0.077 -0.008 0.01
(0.116) (0.116) (0.006)
Probability F tests
insurance dummies 0.1681 0.0131 0.1713
Loglikelihood -802.92 -487.02 -127.49
pseudo R2 0.1389 0.2434 0.2124
obs. 1350 930 930
Notes: Marginal effects reported; errors clustered at the subject level; standard errors in parentheses;
***(**/*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%/10%) level.
structure in upstream markets, this not necessarily leads to lower costs when lower costs imply
that the uninsured face lower potential losses. Indeed, decreases in the potential loss reduces
the demand for insurance by risk-averse consumers, posing a direct threat to the raison d’eˆtre
of the insurer.
We use theory and empirical illustrations to convey how insurers might successfully apply
this mechanism in practice and we present experimental evidence showing that insurer-subjects
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Figure 11: Relation between the estimated risk preferences of insurer-subjects and the
average minimum premium established in their markets.
in the lab routinely move away from the non-insurance outcome because they recognize the
threat of potential losses that are too low for consumers to buy insurance. The introduction
of insurer competition does not change this outcome although it does annihilate the insurers’
profits.
We believe that this research contains an important policy implication and an illustration
of a common misconception. It is beyond doubt that insurances increase welfare by their
risk-sharing properties in markets that we characterize as natural insurance markets. However,
in granting insurers buyer-power as a counterweight to supplier market power, regulators should
pay attention that insurers do not abuse this power to protect insurance markets or to create
them in those realms of life that are non-insurance markets by nature. This may for example
happen when their market power enables insurers to block the introduction of cost-saving tech-
nologies, the entry of cheaper suppliers or by stimulating service suppliers to bundle different
services into a more expensive product.
In our experimental markets, insurer competition drives their profits to zero. However, our
results also show that based on this statistic alone, one should no conclude that competition
guarantees consumers the lowest possible prices because loss sizes are still far above the zero
lower bound and even somewhat higher than in markets that are insurance markets by nature.
Our findings suggest that competitive forces primarily induce insurers to decrease premiums to
the actuarially fair rate for a given loss size but that they are wary to curb the loss sizes.
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W − U−1[pU(W − L) + (1− p)U(W )]− pL} /dL
= −d{U−1[pU(W − L) + (1− p)U(W )]} /dL− p
> −d{U−1[U(p(W − L) + (1− p)W )]} /dL− p
= −d {pW − pL+ (1− p)W} /dL− p
= 0. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In what follows, we assume risk-averse consumers have homogenous risk preferences such that
we can normalize the number of consumers without loss of generality to n = 1. Besides the
premium, consumers have to incur a transaction cost c when buying insurance such that they
only buy insurance if the potential loss L ≥ L(c). L(0) = 0. We assume that the uninsured face
a potential loss L ∈ [L(c),+∞). The proof is in three steps.
a First, in equilibrium R1 = R2 ≤ W − CE(L), i.e. both insurers must charge an identical
premium. For suppose that, say, R1 > R2 > pL2, then E[pi2] > 0 and E[pi1] = 0 because
insurer 1 would not have any clients. Insurer 1 could strictly improve by setting R1 = R2
(and L1 = L2) which would render insurer 1 half of market demand and expected profits
E[pi1] = E[pi2]/2 > 0.
b Second, in equilibrium, the premium by both insurers has to satisfy Ri = pLi for i =
1, 2. That is, the expected profits E[pii] equal zero for both insurers. For suppose that
R2 = R1 > pL1. Then, insurer 1 can strictly increase its expected profits by reducing the
premium by an amount , with 0 <  < (R1−pL1)/2. By undercutting his competitor, he
no longer has to share the market and E[piNew1 ] = (R1− )− pL1 > (R1− pL1)/2 = E[pi1].
c Finally, we prove that in equilibrium L1 = L2 = 0, that is: independent of the loss
L > L(c) faced by the uninsured, the insurers will reduce the cost they have to pay when
one of their customers faces a loss to 0. From b), we know that L1 = L2. Now suppose that
L1 = L2 = L˜ > 0. Then there exists a value L
New with 0 < LNew < L˜ such that if, say
insurer 1, sets L1 = L
New and R(LNew) = W − CE(LNew), he will reap positive profits.
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Because R(L) is increasing in L and R(0) = 0, for LNew sufficiently small, R(LNew) < pL˜:
all consumers prefer insurance by firm 1 to insurance by firm 2 or staying uninsured. 
A.3 Numerical Example
A.3.1 Separate Evaluation Purchase and Insurance Decision
Consider the market described in Section 2.2. A monopolistic firm can supply two versions of
a particular product, one with quality qL and the other with quality qH > qL. The constant
marginal cost of supplying version i ∈ {L,H} is ci. Consumers differ in their taste for quality θ
with a fraction λ (the ‘high types’) having taste parameter θH and the remaining fraction 1− λ
(the low types), θL < θH . Consumers receive a surplus U = θq − x if they buy a product of
quality q at price x.
In what follows, we take the parameter values cL = 0.10; cH = 0.15; θL = 0.3; θH = 0.6; qL =
0.6; qH = 0.8;λ = 0.3; p = 0.3 and γ = 0.9. We consider three cases: a. only quality qL is
supplied; b. only quality qH is supplied, and, c. both qualities are supplied.
a. Only quality qL is supplied The supplier can decide to sell to both types of consumers,
in which case he sets a price p∗L = θLqL = 0.3 · 0.6 = 0.18 and his profits equal pi = θLqL − cL =
0.18−0.08, or only to the high types at price p∗L = θHqL = 0.36 giving profits p˜i = (θHqL−cH)λ =
(0.36− 0.15)0.3 = 0.078.
b. Only quality qH is supplied If the supplier sells the high quality good to both
consumers, he cannot charge more than p∗H = θLqH = 0.24, leading to profits pi = 0.09. In this
case, it is more profitable to sell only to the high types at price p∗H = θHqH = 0.48, giving profits
pˆi = 0.099.
c. Both qualities are supplied If both qualities are supplied, one needs to ensure that
both types buy the good that is designed for them. The low quality product is priced at
p∗L = θLqL = 0.18. To induce the high types to buy the high quality product, the incentive
compatibility constraint θHqH − pH ≥ θHqL − pL needs to be satisfied. This holds for
p∗H = p
∗
L + (qH − qL)θH ,
see Tirole (1988, p. 153), for the given parameter values p∗H = 0.30 and pi
∗
LH = 0.7(0.18−0.10)+
0.3(0.30 − 0.15) = 0.101. This is highest profit that can be obtained such that in isolation, a
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profit-maximizing supplier would decide to supply both goods.
The insurance decision Once the consumer has bought the good at price x, he faces a
potential loss of x. Suppose that he is risk averse with CARA exponential utility function
u(w) = 1 − e−γw with w denoting his wealth level and γ the parameter of risk aversion. The
inverse of this function is u−1(y) = − ln (1− y)/γ. The insurance premium R(x) for which
u(w −R(x)) = pu(w − x) + (1− p)u(w).
is by definition the premium that makes this consumer indifferent between buying insurance and
staying uninsured. For our utility specification, we can solve for R(x):
R(x) = ln 1− p+ peγx/γ. (A.1)
The insurers expected profits from selling one insurance policy to recoup the loss of x at a
premium R(x) are
E[piINS ] = R(x)− px.
For the given parameters, the insurer’s total expected profits when both products are sup-
plied are: E[piLHINS ] = (1−λ)(R(pL)−p·pL)+λ(R(pH)−p·pH) = 0.7(0.057−0.3·0.18)+0.3(0.099−
0.3 ·0.3) ≈ 0.0048. However, the insurer attains higher expected profits when only the high qual-
ity is supplied to the high types. Then, E[piHINS ] = λ(R(pH)− p · pH) = 0.3(0.167− 0.3 · 0.48) ≈
0.0069. In order words, the insurer has an incentive to press the supplier to stop offering the low
quality product. Moreover, in the case at hand, with 0.10588 the joint profits of the supplier
and insurer when only the high quality product is offered are higher than the combined profits
of 0.10583 when both products are supplied. This implies that the insurer can reimburse the
supplier for any profits lost from not supplying the low quality version and still benefit.
A.3.2 Simultaneous Evaluation Purchase and Insurance Decision
Now consider the case where the consumer does not separate the purchase and insurance decision.
That is, at the time of purchase he is aware that buying the product involves a risk which
entails that now or at some future moment he will buy against this risk. This implies that his
willingness to pay for the product reduces to x defined by the implicit function x = θq −R(x).
An approximate solution for x can be obtained by using (A.1), take exponentials of the left- and
right-hand side and use a second-order Taylor approximation for the exponential functions in
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the resulting equation. The approximate solution x∗ = (−b−√b2 − 4ac)/2a, with a = γ2(1−p);
b = −γ(1 + p+ 2γθq), and c = γθq(1 + γθq).
In this case and for the given parameter values, the insurer’s expected profits are still higher
when only the high quality product is supplied but offering both maximizes the combined profits
of the insurer and supplier.
B Additional Tables and Figures
Table B.1: Sessions summary
Loss size (L) Fixed Fixed Free Free Free Free
Loss probability (p) 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.6
Insurance market? (L0) 0 0 20 0
Competition MON MON MON MON DUOP DUOP
Session # mkts.
1 Mar. 21, 2012 4 x
2 Mar. 22, 2012 3 x
3 Mar. 22, 2012 3 x
4 Mar. 23, 2012 3 x
5 Mar. 23, 2012 2 x
6 Jun. 20, 2012 4 x
7 Jun. 20, 2012 3 x
8 Nov. 19, 2012 3 x
9 Nov. 20, 2012 5 x
10 Nov. 21, 2012 4 x
11 Nov. 21, 2012 5 x
12 Nov. 23, 2012 4 x
13 Apr. 11, 2013 3 x
14 Apr. 11, 2013 3 x
15 Apr. 12, 2013 2 x
16 Apr. 12, 2013 3 x
17 Sep. 30, 2013 2 x
18 Sep. 30, 2013 1 x
19 Oct. 01, 2013 2 x
20 Oct. 03, 2013 1 x
Total # of markets: 60 12 10 10 11 9 8
Total # of subjects: 377 72 60 60 66 63 56
Note:
In the sessions with fixed loss sizes, the following orders were implemented in the periods [1−15]/[16−30]:
Session 1: 16/4, 4/16, 8/20; Session 2:12/20, 20/12, 12/4; Session 3: 12/20, 20/12, 12/4;
Session 8: 4/16, 8/20; Session 9: 4/16, 4/12, 12/4, 12/20, 20/12;
Session 10: 8/20, 12/4, 12/20, 4/12.
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(a) Traditional Dutch bicycle. (b) Modern electric bicycle.
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